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WILL THEY STAY OR WILL THEY GO?:
AN EXAMINATION OF SOUTH AFRICA’S
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
ARBITRATION POLICY
s the world becomes more interconnected, international
investment disputes are on the rise.1 For states who host
foreign investors the stakes are higher than ever. Uncertainty
surrounding the outcome of investment disputes, coupled with
their high price and lengthy duration, are leading some states
to reconsider the effectiveness of bilateral investment treaties
(BITs).2 Reconsideration of BITs has pushed the international
investment treaty regime towards a legitimacy crisis.3 It is evi-
dent that the current system needs to undergo reform, but it is
less apparent how that reform should be implemented and
what issues should take priority.4 Responding to the crisis, the
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL)5 began researching “possible reforms in the field
of investor-state arbitration” hoping to stabilize the regime.6 In
2017, UNCITRAL established Working Group III and tasked it
with procedural reform of investor-state dispute settlement




2. U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law [UNCITRAL], Possible Reform of
Investor State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), ¶¶ 9, 14-16 U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.149 (Sept. 4, 2018) [hereinafter W.P. 149]; Holger Hes-
termeyer & Anna De Luca, Duration of ISDS Proceedings EJIL:TALK! (Apr. 3,
2019), https://www.ejiltalk.org/duration-of-isds-proceedings/.
3. The term legitimacy crisis will be discussed infra Section II.
4. W.P. 149, supra note 2, ¶¶ 1–3.
5. UNCITRAL is a body established by the United Nations General As-
sembly which “[promotes] the progressive harmonization and unification of
the law of international trade” G.A. Res. 2205 (XXI), §I, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/2205 (Dec. 17, 1966).
6. UNCITRAL, Rep. Working Group III (Investor-State Dispute Settle-
ment Reform) on the Work of Its Thirty-Fourth Session, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/930/Rev.1 (Dec. 19, 2017).
A
150 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 46:1
(ISDS).7 The Working Group was tasked with a three-step pro-
cess and broad discretion to accomplish its mandate.8
However, not all states are content remaining in the interna-
tional investment treaty regime or waiting for the Working
Group to promulgate its suggested reforms. In 2018, South Af-
rica’s much debated Protection of Investment Act, 2015 (the
Act) went into effect.9 Designed to replace the state’s BITs, the
Act signified a radical shift in South Africa’s attitude towards
international investment policy.10 Onlookers feared that South
Africa’s decision to terminate these agreements would make
the state less attractive to foreign investors.11 Investors wor-
ried about the safety of their investments in South Africa.12
However, South Africa is not alone in its decision to terminate
its BITs; it joined four other states exploring alternative
frameworks for international investment.13 Many former Euro-
7. Id. ¶ 6.
8. Id. The mandate is as follows: “(i) first, identify and consider concerns
regarding ISDS; (ii) second, consider whether reform was desirable in light of
any identified concerns; and (iii) . . . develop any relevant solutions to be rec-
ommended to the Commission.” Id.
9. Phillip de Wet, Ramaphosa just activated a law that scares foreign in-
vestors – and makes it harder for them to fight expropriation, BUS. INSIDER: S.
AFR. (July 13, 2018, 5:29 PM), https://www.businessinsider.co.za/protection-
of-investment-act-commencement-gazetted-foreign-mediation-bee-section-25-
constitution-2018-7.
10. See id. Prior to South Africa’s decision to reform its international in-
vestment policy it was party to 23 BITs. Sarah McKenzie, Nick Alp, Vlad
Movshovich & Trevor Versfeld, SA investment laws: Foreign investors with
treaty protection may challenge land expropriation, IOL (Dec. 10, 2019),
https://www.iol.co.za/business-report/opinion/sa-investment-laws-foreign-
investors-with-treaty-protection-may-challenge-land-expropriation-38945189
[hereinafter SA Investment Laws]; Adam Green, South Africa: BITs in pieces,
FIN. TIMES (Oct. 19, 2012), https://www.ft.com/content/b0eec497-5123-3939-
92f7-a5fbcb73dd33. South Africa began unilaterally terminating treaties in
2013. SA Investment Laws, supra note 10. It is currently still party to 12
BITs, and is in the process of terminating half of them. Id.
11. Stephen Hurt, Why South Africa has ripped up foreign investment
deals, THE CONVERSATION (Dec. 17, 2013, 1:43 AM),
http://theconversation.com/why-south-africa-has-ripped-up-foreign-
investment-deals-20868; Leandi Kolver, SA proceeds with termination of bi-
lateral investment treaties, POLITY (Oct. 21, 2013),
https://www.polity.org.za/article/sa-proceeds-with-termination-of-bilateral-
investment-treaties-2013-10-21.
12. De Wet supra note 9.
13. See Termination of Bilateral Investment Treaties Has Not Negatively
Affected Countries Foreign Direct Investment Inflows, PUB. CITIZEN 1, 1
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pean colonies hastily entered into BITs soon after gaining in-
dependence to finance ambitious infrastructure and education
projects.14 As a result, these states now find themselves bound
to vague agreements that make it difficult to understand what
obligations they owe foreign investors.15
This Note seeks to examine South Africa’s Protection of In-
vestment Act, 2015, its proposal for ISDS reform to Working
Group III, and its comments during ISDS reform meetings
through the lens of Albert Hirschman’s Exit, Voice, and Loyalty
theory.16 This Note argues that, contrary to both popular belief
and statements made by the nation, South Africa’s apparent
exit from the international investment regime is part of a long-
term policy strategy to promote advantageous ISDS reform. To
date, the content and application of the Act has been a source
of significant academic discussion; however, there is little, if
any, discussion that explains the seeming contradiction of
South Africa’s passage of the Act with its participation in
Working Group III’s reform discussions what might explain the
contradiction.
This Note proceeds in four parts. Part I describes the history
of the investment treaty regime, chronicling the shift from cus-
tomary international law to BITs. Part II discusses the draw-
backs of the current BIT regime.. Part III details the evolution
of South Africa’s investment policy, which culminated in the
Protection of Investment Act, 2015. Finally, Part IV analyzes
South Africa’s words and actions under the Exit, Voice and
Loyalty theory, arguing that, contrary to the suggestions of
commentators, South Africa is not turning its back on the in-
vestment regime. Instead, it is attempting to promote desired
reform within the existing international framework while pre-
(Apr. 2018), https://www.citizen.org/wp-content/uploads/pcgtw_fdi-inflows-
from-bit-termination_0.pdf.
14. See JONATHAN BONNITCHA, LAUGE N. SLOVGAARD POULSEN & MICHAEL
WAIBEL, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE INVESTMENT TREATY REGIME 46 (Ox-
ford U. Press 2017).
15. Kavaljit Singh & Burghard Ilge, Introduction in RETHINKING
BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES: CRITICAL ISSUES AND POLICY CHOICES 1, 3
(Kavaljit Singh et al. 2016); James x. Zhan, International Investment Rule-
making; Trends, Challenges and Way Forward in RETHINKING BILATERAL
INVESTMENT TREATIES: CRITICAL ISSUES AND POLICY CHOICES, 17, 20 (Kavaljit
Singh et al. 2016).
16. Exit, Voice, and Loyalty theory will be discussed at length infra Part
IV.
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serving an option to remain outside the system if adequate re-
form is not enacted.
I. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT PROTECTION
The modern international investment treaty regime is rooted
in customary international law.17 Initially, however, the protec-
tion of foreign investors and their investments derived from the
domestic law where the investment was located.18 Homogeneity
between the domestic laws of the major states in the 19th cen-
tury led to a relatively uniform standard of treatment for do-
mestic and foreign investors.19 However, the Russian Revolu-
tion brought about a major shift in the law.20 In accordance
with the socialist principles underpinning their new govern-
ment, the Soviets pursued aggressive expropriation policies
against nationals and aliens.21 Met with outrage from the in-
ternational community, the Soviet government argued that
they did not violate the rights of aliens because the expropria-
tion policy did not solely target foreigners,22 as the government
was seizing the property of nationals and foreigners alike.23
The Soviet government abolished private property ownership
in favor of communal property ownership in sharp contrast
with the West’s emphasis on private property rights.24 The So-
viet Union’s rationale would also prove influential, as Mexico
employed the same argument in 1938 to defend nationalizing
its agrarian and oil industries.25
This defense became the basis of the modern national treat-
ment standard, which requires states to treat foreigners as well
as they treat their own nationals.26 Therefore, as long as there
17. See RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUR, PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 5 (2d ed. Oxford U. Press 2012)
18. Id. at 1.
19. Id.
20. See id. at 5.
21. Id. at 2.
22. Id. The Soviet government would ultimately be required to compensate
the alien investor under a theory of unjust enrichment as part of the Lena
Goldfields Arbitration of 1930. Id.
23. Id.
24. John N. Hazard, Soviet Property Law, 30 CORNELL L. REV., 466, 469
(1945).
25. DOLZER & SCHREUR, supra note 17, at 2.
26. See id.
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is no disparity in treatment between the two groups, there is no
a violation of international law.27 The actions of the Soviet Un-
ion and Mexico demonstrated a shift in the status quo and sig-
naled to investors that they could no longer rely on domestic
laws to the same extent to protect their investments. For the
first time, states had to confront a major difference in their
views on investment, property and claims adjudication.28 In
response to the Mexican government’s actions, United States
Secretary of State Cordell Hull acknowledged that while ex-
propriation may be legal under certain circumstances, it is only
legal against foreigners with “prompt, adequate and effective
compensation.”29
The international investment system remained largely un-
changed until the end of World War II. As decolonization con-
tinued in the post-war period, new states seeking economic
freedom took their fight to the United Nations and passed a
resolution titled “Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Re-
sources.”30 The General Assembly’s one country, one vote
mechanism tipped in favor of the developing, capital-importing
states—a bloc that constituted a bulk of United Nations mem-
bership.31 Notably, the General Assembly passed Resolution
1803, which stated, inter alia, that “the admission of foreign
investment was subject to the authorization, restriction or pro-
hibition of the state and would be treated in accordance with
national and international law.”32 It further stipulated that ex-
propriation should be compensated but declined to adopt the
Hull Standard.33 Instead, Resolution 1803 required that com-
pensation be “appropriate.”34
Separately, the international community began to reexamine
the status and protection of aliens in other areas of interna-
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. Secretary Hull’s response would become known as the Hull Formu-
la. BONNITCHA ET AL., supra note 14, at 121.
30. ANDREW NEWCOMBE & LUIS PARADELL, LAW AND PRACTICE OF
INVESTMENT TREATIES 26 (Kluwer Law International 2009).
31. See Growth in United Nations membership, 1945-present, U.N.,
https://www.un.org/en/sections/member-states/growth-united-nations-
membership-1945-present/index.html (charting UN membership during de-
colonization).
32. NEWCOMBE &PARADELL, supra note 30, at 26.
33. Id. at 26–27.
34. Id. at 26.
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tional law.35 The European Court of Human Rights raised con-
cerns about the vulnerability of aliens given their inability to
participate in the policymaking process in foreign states.36 Af-
ter much debate, consensus emerged that aliens should be pro-
tected against certain measures of a foreign state by the rules
of international law, operating independently of a state’s do-
mestic law.37 This rationale bled into the fledgling internation-
al investment regime leading to the development of the inter-
national minimum standard.38 A violation of this standard oc-
curs when the treatment of an alien amounts to “an outrage . . .
bad faith . . . willful neglect of duty, or to an insufficiency of
governmental action so far short of the international standards
that every reasonable . . . man would . . . recognize its insuffi-
ciency.”39 The addition of the international minimum standard
complicated international dispute resolution.40 States now had
to choose between the international minimum standard or the
national treatment standard as their guiding standard of
treatment for foreign investments.41 Following decolonization,
emerging states favored the national treatment standard which
promoted state sovereignty, while established states favored
the international minimum standard, which preserved the sta-
tus quo for its investors.42
A. Dispute Resolution under Customary Law
If a standard of treatment is breached, the home state may
pursue a claim via diplomatic protection on behalf of its injured
citizen.43 Diplomatic protection allows a home state to claim
the injury of their national as its own and use its discretion to
pursue a claim against the host state.44 To receive diplomatic
protection, the injured investor must show that they are a na-




39. L.F.H. Neer and Pauline Neer (U.S.) v. United Mexican States, 4
R.I.A.A 60, 61-62 (U.S.-Mex. Gen. Claims Comm’n 1926).
40. BONNITCHA ET AL., supra note 14, at 12.
41. See DOLZER & SCHREUR, supra note 17, at 1–4 (explaining the develop-
ment and application of the international minimum standard and the nation-
al treatment standard).
42. BONNITCHA ET AL., supra note 14, at 46.
43. Id. at 22.
44. Id. at 23, 68.
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tional of the home state and that they have exhausted all local
remedies in the host state.45
The exercise of diplomatic protection has several drawbacks
for injured investors. First and foremost is the requirement the
investor exhaust local remedies.46 Moving a claim through the
host state’s legal system can take years and be very costly.47
Second, the home state is under no obligation to pursue the
claim of the investor.48 The doctrine of diplomatic protection
merely grants the state discretion to pursue a claim—it does
not mandate its pursuit.49 Since states prefer to maintain the
status quo in international relations, they may choose not to
pursue claims against their strategic allies.50 However, failure
to intervene on behalf of an injured national may have drastic
political costs domestically.51 As a result, home states must
weigh the costs of pursuing a claim as to do so may conflict
with broader foreign policy objectives.52 Furthermore, when an
individual seeks the assistance of their home state to pursue a
claim, they relinquish control over the claim.53 When exercising
diplomatic protection, the state claims the individual’s injury
as its own and is thus entitled to any compensation; i.e., there
45. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain),
Judgment, 1970 I.C.J. Rep. 3, at 27, 46 (Feb. 5).
46. BONNITCHA ET AL., supra note 14, at 68.
47. CHRISTIAN TIETJE & FREYA BAETENS, THE IMPACT OF INVESTOR-STATE-




48. Belg. v. Spain, 1970 I.C.J. at 50.
49. Christoph Schreuer, Investment Protection and International Rela-
tions, in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: LIBER AMICORUM HANSPETER
NEUHOLD 345, 345 (August Reinisch & Ursula Kriebaum eds., Eleven Int’l
Pub. 2007).
50. Jack S. Levy, Prospect Theory and International Relations: Theoretical
Applications and Analytical Problems, 13 POL. PSYCHOL. 283, 284 (1992).
51. BONNITCHA ET AL., supra note 14, at 194–95.
52. Id. One prominent example of this can be seen in a 1938 dispute be-
tween the United States and Mexico. Id. The executive branch of the United
States was hesitant to pursue a claim for fear that the pursuit would push
Mexico towards the Soviets. Id. However, Congress was more responsive to
investors who lobbied for their interest, particularly during an election year.
Id. This set up a clash between foreign policy goals and domestic goals. See
generally id.
53. Schreuer, supra note 49, at 345.
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is no guarantee that the state will pass the compensation on to
their national.54
Proponents of diplomatic protection argue that the interna-
tional system is comprised of states and that they alone are the
entities empowered to bring claims against other states.55 They
further argue that the discretion to pursue claims serves as a
gatekeeping function preventing the system from being over-
burdened by frivolous claims.56 Those in favor of allowing indi-
viduals to bring claims argue that states abuse their discretion
to bring claims, filtering claims based on politics rather than
merit.57 Thus, the ability for an individual to bring their own
claim depoliticizes the dispute, allows them to retain control for
the life of the claim, and ensures that any compensation for in-
jury goes to directly to the injured investor.58
B. Shifting from Customary Law to Bilateral Investment Trea-
ties
After losing the fight for favorable and predictable investor
protections at the United Nations, capital-exporting states re-
sponded by implementing a network of bilateral investment
treaties. BITs allow capital-exporting states, to obtain more
favorable access to capital-importing markets.59 While each
agreement varies, virtually all BITs provide foreign investors
protection from expropriation and discrimination, and with a
dispute resolution mechanism via binding arbitration.60 Under-
standing how BITs differ from investor protections derived
from customary law serves as an important backdrop to under-
standing why countries such as South Africa have terminated
them.
Modern day BITs are “treaties between two or more states
that have the protection of foreign investment as the primary,
54. Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection with commentaries, [2006] 2
Y.B. of Int’l Law Comm’n, pt. 2, art. 19, cmt. 1 U.N. Doc (A/61/10).
55. BONNITCHA ET AL., supra note 14, at 65.
56. See id. at 67.
57. Id. at 193.
58. See Primer: International Investment Treaties and Investor-State Dis-
pute Settlement, COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT,
http://ccsi.columbia.edu/2019/06/03/primer-international-investment-treaties-
and-investor-state-dispute-settlement/ (last updated May 31, 2019).
59. See NEWCOMBE &PARADELL, supra note 30, at 41.
60. BONNITCHA ET AL., supra note 14, at 3.
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or only subject matter.”61 While no two BITs are identical, vir-
tually all investment treaties provide broad provisions that
protect the foreign investor against expropriation absent ade-
quate compensation and discrimination.62 Increasingly, BITs
provide investors with additional protections including breach-
es of contract and against losses as a result of political or social
upheaval.63 BITs also reduce the transaction costs associated
with investing for investors who now no longer need to negoti-
ate individual contracts with the host state before investing.64
However, because these BITs are intended to cover invest-
ments in all sectors of the economy, they are often drafted ex-
pansively to ensure broad applicability.65 This broad applicabil-
ity, coupled with a decentralized claims process, opens the door
to a flood of litigation against host states.66
Another major development provided by BITs is their dispute
resolution mechanism. Rather than relying on diplomatic pro-
tection, states included provisions allowing foreign investors to
seek resolution of their claims through binding international
arbitration.67 Today, 96% of all BITs contain language for ISDS
via binding arbitration.68 ISDS provisions and coverage vary
widely, making it difficult for a uniform set of rules to
emerge.69 However almost all BITs provide for “broad and bind-
ing consent . . . to arbitration of disputes between foreign inves-
tors and host state.”70 These arbitrations can be either ad hoc
or institutional proceedings presided over by a variety of organ-




64. Id. at 24.
65. See id. at 26.
66. Luke Peterson, Changing Investment Litigation, Bit by BIT, 5, INT’L
CENTRE FOR TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE DEV. 11, 11 (2001).
67. See BONNITCHA ET AL., supra note 14, at 4. The first BIT to include
state consent to arbitration as a mechanism for dispute resolution was the
Italy-Chad BIT (1969). Id. at 62.
68. JOACHIM POHL, KEKELETSO MASHIGO & ALEXIS NOHEN, DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT PROVISIONS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS: A
LARGE SAMPLE SURVEY 10 (2012).
69. See BONNITCHA ET AL., supra note 14, at 55.
70. Id. at 4.
71. Institutional vs.’ad hoc’ arbitration, PINSENT MASONS (Aug. 12, 2011,
10:56 a.m.), https://www.pinsentmasons.com/out-law/guides/institutional-vs-
ad-hoc-arbitration.
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latitude to decide who will serve as an arbitrator, how they will
be selected, and what rules will govern the proceeding.72 Insti-
tutional arbitrations allow significantly less flexibility in the
procedure surrounding the arbitration, which is carried out by
a predetermined arbitral body maintaining its own rules and
procedures.73 Arbitration provisions not only give the arbitral
body the power to decide the claim on the merits, but also
broad power to determine their own jurisdiction, and deliver
awards that exceed amounts available in domestic courts.74
Foreign investors can bring a variety of claims to an arbitral
tribunal under the BIT, but the majority of claims are claims
based on expropriation or discrimination.75 Arbitral tribunals
have distinguished between two types of expropriation: “de fac-
to” or “creeping” expropriation.76 A de facto expropriation oc-
curs when a host state’s “actions or laws transfer assets to
third parties different from the [host] State or where . . . per-
sons [are deprived] of their ownership of . . . assets” without
reallocation to a third party or government.77 A particularly
influential standard of de facto expropriation arose from Tec-
nicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. The United Mexican
States (Tecmed).78 The award states that a de facto expropria-
tion has occurred if the claimant is “deprived of the economical
use and enjoyment of its investment.”79 While there is no wide-
ly agreed upon definition of creeping expropriation, it is “gen-
erally understood that [it] materialize[s] through actions or
conduct, which do not explicitly express the purpose of depriv-
ing one of rights or assets, but actually have that effect.80
72. Id.
73. Id. Some common international arbitral bodies include the interna-
tional court of arbitration, International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), the
London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA), and the International
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). Id; see generally,
BONNITCHA ET AL., supra note 14, at 5, 22–23. ICSID arbitrations account for
over 60% of public investor-state arbitrations with over 2/3rds of those based
on treaties. BONNITCHA ET AL., supra note 14, at 69.
74. BONNITCHA ET AL., supra note 14, at 4.
75. Id. at 94.
76. Id. at 93, 104–05.
77. Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. The United Mexican
States, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/00/2, Award, ¶ 113 (May 29, 2003).
78. Id.
79. Id. ¶ 114.
80. Id.
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Creeping expropriation can occur through either a single action
or a series of actions over time that deprive a foreign investor
of their asset.81
However, not all expropriations constitute a violation of the
BIT. An expropriation may be legal if it comports with due pro-
cess, pursues a legitimate public policy, and is appropriately
compensated.82 To determine whether an unlawful expropria-
tion has occurred, an arbitral tribunal must examine the evi-
dence presented and determine whether the state validly exer-
cised its regulatory powers or whether the state’s actions were
designed to devalue foreign assets.83 While regulations passed
by the host state may be well-intentioned, arbitral bodies have
determined that the intent of regulations at issue are less im-
portant than their effect.84 This sweeping determination has
led to a regulatory chill among host states who hesitate to
regulate in the interest of their citizens because of looming
lawsuits by powerful foreign investors.85
Investors also bring claims against the host state on the basis
of discrimination.86 Discrimination claims can be brought for
violations of the national treatment standard or the most-
favored-nation standard.87
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is a vital part of a developing
state’s economy. As a finite resource, basic economic principles
drive developing states to compete with one another to attract
foreign investment.88 Following the advice of the World Bank,
United Nations, and other international experts, a majority of
developing states began to negotiate and implement bilateral
investment treaties to entice foreign investors.89
81. Id.
82. BONNITCHA ET AL., supra note 14, at 16.
83. Tecnicas Medioambientales, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/00/2, ¶115.
84. Id. ¶ 116.
85. BONNITCHA ET AL., supra note 14, at 17.
86. Id. at 96.
87. Id. at 151.
88. CHARLES OMAN, POLICY COMPETITION FOR FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT:
A STUDY OF COMPETITION AMONG GOVERNMENTS TO ATTRACT FDI 7 (OECD
2000).
89. BONNITCHA ET AL, supra note 14, at 11.
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II. DRAWBACKS OF THE BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY
REGIME
The bilateral investment treaty regime is experiencing a le-
gitimacy crisis.90 Institutional legitimacy is subject to dynamic
perspectives on “appropriate behavior . . . revised through
changing practices and interstate deliberation.”91 Perspectives
on what is appropriate are shaped by complex political and so-
cial structures.92 These structures are subject to evolution over
time as attitudes and expectations shift with the addition of
new players and new agendas.93 New additions “reopen delib-
erations over the bases of legitimacy through which the institu-
tion is empowered.”94 While these shocks to the system can be
expected, it is much more difficult to predict when they will oc-
cur and what impact they will have on the institution.95
When these shocks occur, disputes arise over the best re-
sponse.96 The intensity of disagreement depends on the intensi-
ty of change, with intensity of disagreement increasing with
the intensity of change. For example, it is common for major
reform to be obstructed rather than being adopted by general
90. Legitimacy is defined as “the appropriateness of certain rules govern-
ing state behavior.” Diane Imerman, Contested Legitimacy and Institutional
Change: Unpacking the Dynamics of Institutional Legitimacy, 20 INT’L
STUDIES REV., 74, 74–75 (2018). Legitimacy is comprised of a temporal dy-
namic and a subjective dynamic. Id. at 74. The temporal dynamic is defined
as “how perceptions of legitimacy vary in response to an intrinsically dynamic
political environment.” Id. at 75. The subjective dynamic is defined as “the
variability with which individual states and other actors in the international
system understand an institution’s legitimacy.” Id. These two dynamics work
together to inform a state’s opinion on the legitimacy of an institution. See id.
at 75–76. As a result, two states may determine an institution is legitimate
for different reasons. Id. at 76. During a period where an institution’s legiti-
macy is in question, renegotiating can uncover tensions between two state’s
reasons for conferring legitimacy. Id. While negotiating requires some com-
promise, changes to some institutional behaviors while ignoring others,
threatens the underlying perceptions that legitimize the institution. Id. The
degree of reform success depends on the degree to which the reform “aggra-
vate[s] or alleviate[s] the contested notions of legitimacy.” Id. Therefore, in-
stitutions should balance the collection of information about the contested
notions of legitimacy with the urgency of reform.
91. Id. at 75.
92. Id.
93. See id. at 76.
94. Id.
95. See id. at 75.
96. Id. at 76.
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consensus.97 New players with new ideas place pressure on the
institution to adapt to remain legitimate.98 As the pressure in-
creases, the institution risks falling into a legitimacy trap.99 A
legitimacy trap occurs at the point when the “probability of ob-
structive disagreement is highest precisely when the pressures
to adapt are [the] most intense.”100
The termination of BITs signals that states are questioning
the legitimacy of the BIT regime. States began terminating
BITs in 2008.101 In 2013 and 2014, UNCITRAL took note of the
growing dissatisfaction among states and began discussing
possible steps for reform.102 By 2017, UNCITRAL gave Working
Group III its mandate for reform. During its thirty-fourth ses-
sion, Working Group III addressed state concerns regarding
ISDS.103 Those concerns broadly fell into two categories. First,
concerns over the arbitral process and outcomes, and second,
those over arbitrators and decision-makers.104 Some examples
of procedural concerns include the costs and duration associat-
ed with arbitration,105 the lack of mechanisms to review
awards,106 issues with enforcement,107 and the inconsistency of
awards.108 Each of these will be discussed briefly below to pro-
vide the context necessary to understand South Africa’s at-
97. Id. at 88 (See Figure 1, which compares intensity of change with inten-
sity of disagreement).
98. Id. at 75.
99. Id. at 76.
100. Id.
101. Termination of Bilateral Investment Treaties Has Not Negatively Af-
fected Countries ’Foreign Direct Investment Inflows, PUB. CITIZEN 1, 2 (Apr.
2018), https://www.citizen.org/wp-content/uploads/pcgtw_fdi-inflows-from-bit-
termination_0.pdf. Ecuador terminated its first BIT in 2008. Id. Bolivia be-
gan terminating BITs in 2009 and South Africa in 2010. Id. Indonesia and
India gave notice that they would terminate their BITs in 2014 and 2016,
respectively. Id.
102. UNCITRAL, Rep. on the Work of its Forty-Sixth Session, ¶¶ 129–133,
U.N. Doc. A/68/17 (2013).
103. See generally UNCITRAL, Possible Reform of Investor-State Dispute
Settlement (ISDS), U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.142 (Sept. 18, 2017) [here-
inafter W.P. 142].
104. Id. ¶ 20.
105. Id. ¶ 16.
106. Id. ¶ 39–41.
107. Id. ¶ 39.
108. Id. ¶ 31–38.
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tempt to seek reform through its domestic legislation and calls
for reform in Working Group III.
A. Cost and Duration Associated with Arbitration
One of the initial allures of arbitration was that it provided a
dispute resolution mechanism that was faster and less expen-
sive than traditional litigation; however, that has not played
out in practice.109 In 2018, Working Group III determined that
the average cost of ISDS arbitration is $8 million.110 The aver-
age length of arbitration is three to four years.111 The rising
costs of ISDS arbitration have put a significant financial strain
on host states who are then criticized by their citizens for im-
proper use of public funds.112 This complaint cannot be ignored
since a majority of respondent states have limited financial re-
sources, hence their need to import capital into their markets
in the first place.113 The increasing cost of arbitration may be a
result of the legal complexities involved in the cases, however it
is worth understanding exactly what is factored into the cost of
an arbitration.114
The cost of arbitration can be broken down into tribunal
costs, administrative costs, and party costs.115 Tribunal costs
capture those costs associated with arbitrator fees and tribunal
secretaries, while administrative costs capture fees that may be
charged by the governing arbitral institution.116 A bulk of the
costs—approximately 80-90%—are party costs.117 These costs
include the fees associated with legal counsel and expert wit-
nesses.118 While these costs may be burdensome for investors
who seek to bring claims to arbitration, the burdens are com-
pounded for respondent states who must engage in arbitrations
109. Id. ¶ 23.
110. UNCITRAL, Rep. of Working Group III (Investor-State Dispute Set-
tlement Reform) on the Work of its Thirty-Fourth Session, ¶ 36, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/930/Rev.1 (2017) [hereinafter Rep. 930].
111. UNCITRAL, Possible Reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement —
Cost and Duration, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.153 (Aug. 31, 2018)
[hereinafter W.P. 153].
112. W.P. 142, supra note 103, ¶ 25.
113. W.P. 153, supra note 111, ¶ 8.
114. W.P. 142, supra note 103, ¶ 24.
115. W.P. 153, supra note 111, ¶ 18.
116. Id.
117. Id. ¶ 19.
118. Id.
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with numerous investors. Each arbitration that states are en-
gaged in takes away valuable funds that could be used to fund
public programs for their citizens. Finally, a state may incur
additional costs associated with collection of an award or for
defense against enforcement of an award.119
B. Lack of Review Mechanisms
Compared to domestic legal systems, the international arbi-
tration system is rudimentary. Notably absent from the inter-
national arbitration system is a central body responsible for
appeals of arbitral awards and overseeing the conduct of arbi-
tral proceedings.120 In response, Working Group III has re-
ceived numerous proposals for the creation of a centralized dis-
pute resolution institution with an appellate mechanism.121
States argue that the creation of a centralized dispute mecha-
nism will help ensure the “procedural and substantive correct-
ness of decisions . . . providing parties with a coherent and fair
decision.”122 Working Group III has reviewed various existing
appellate mechanisms to determine the scope of review that
the proposed appellate body would have.123 The Working Group
has also discussed the effect of appeal124 and the composition of
the ISDS appellate body.125
One argument in support of this decentralized system is that
arbitration is a private dispute mechanism and as such, their
decision has no bearing on future arbitral proceedings.126 This
119. Id. ¶ 21.
120. See BONNITCHA ET AL., supra note 14, at 77–78.
121. UNCITRAL, Possible Reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement
(ISDS) Appellate Mechanism and Enforcement Issues, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/WG.III/WP. — (unpublished) available at
https://uncitral.un.org/en/working_groups/3/investor-state (last accessed Sept.
13, 2020) (author cites to the unpublished draft document which was open for
comment at the time of publication); See e.g., id. at n.3 (detailing the pro-
posals for an appellate mechanism received by Working Group III).
122. UNCITRAL, Possible Reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement
(ISDS) Appellate and Multilateral Court Mechanisms, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.185 (Nov. 29, 2019) [hereinafter W.P. 185].
123. Id. ¶¶ 11–18. Working Group III examined international and domestic
appellate mechanisms including the World Trade Organization, the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. Id.
124. Id. ¶¶ 24– 33.
125. Id. ¶¶ 34– 36.
126. BONNITCHA ET AL., supra note 14, at 246.
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argument suggests that each arbitration is fully autonomous,
rather than a piece of a complex legal regime.127 However, arbi-
tral awards frequently cite to awards from other tribunals that
have confronted similar issues, reinforcing the belief that arbi-
tral tribunals fulfill a governance role and help determine what
the law should be going forward.128 Bodies tasked with such an
important role should be subject to certain norms including
predictability, transparency, and consistency.129
C. Issues with Enforcement
The few defenses against enforcement relate to procedural
defects, such as lack of transparency by the arbitrator or
awards for issues beyond the scope of the arbitration clause.130
The threshold to overcome the presumption of enforcement is
high, and most courts will enforce an award unless there is
overwhelming evidence of serious procedural misconduct.131 As
it stands, states argue that the arbitration system tends to fa-
vor investors and provides little review of awards rendered.132
States that are against arbitration provisions argue that for-
eign investors are already the recipient of specialized protec-
tions and do not need their own dispute settlement mecha-
nism.133 They further argue that requiring states to bring
claims on behalf of their injured nationals plays an important
gatekeeping process.134
D. Inconsistency of Awards
States complain about the inconsistency in awards rendered
by ISDS. Working Group III indicated that some of this incon-
sistency may result from the varying standards captured by
BITs.135 Other inconsistencies result from the types of claims
brought to the arbitral tribunal.136 Regardless of the cause of
127. Id.
128. Id. at 246–47.
129. Id. at 247.
130. Id. at 77.
131. Id. at 78.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 12.
134. Id. at 246.
135. W.P. 142, supra note 103, ¶ 32.
136. Id. ¶ 33.
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the inconsistency, states argue that the inconsistencies must be
resolved to preserve the legitimacy of ISDS.137
One scenario states expressed concern over instances where
separate tribunals have reached different conclusions regard-
ing standards or procedural issues under the same BIT.138 In
these cases, the facts were either the same or the differences
were de minimis, and, in the opinion of the states, did not war-
rant differing conclusions.139 The Working Group cited Enron
Corporation and Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. Argentine Republic
and Continental Casualty Company v. Argentine Republic as an
illustrative example of this problem.140 Both arbitrations were
governed by the US-Argentinian BIT.141 Both claims arose fol-
lowing aggressive measures taken by the Argentinian govern-
ment to reverse an economic crisis that began in the late
‘90s.142 Claimants in both cases argued that the measures
passed by the Argentinian government amounted to an unlaw-
ful regulatory expropriation.143 In each case, Argentina argued
that the measures taken were necessary for their own essential
security interest and thus the regulatory measures were pro-
tected by Article XI of the US-Argentine BIT.144 The tribunal in
Continental found that the economic crisis fell within the scope
of Article XI.145 Conversely, the tribunal in Enron found that
137. Id. ¶ 31.
138. UNCITRAL, Possible Reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement
(ISDS): Consistency and Related Matters, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.150 (Aug. 28, 2018) [hereinafter W.P. 150].
139. Id.
140. Id. at ¶¶ 11, 16, n. 5, 18.
141. Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. Argentine Republic,
ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, ¶ 4 (May 22, 2007); Continental Casualty Com-
pany v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, ¶ 1 (Sep. 5, 2008).
142. Enron, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, ¶ 63; Continental, ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/9, ¶ 100.
143. Enron, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, ¶ 89; Continental, ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/9, ¶ 63.
144. Treaty between United States of America and the Argentine Republic
Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment,
U.S.-Arg., art. 11, Nov. 14, 1991, S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-2 (1993). Article XI
reads: “This Treaty shall not preclude the application by either Party of
measures necessary for the maintenance of public order, the fulfillment of its
obligations with respect to the maintenance or restoration of international
peace or security, or the protection of its own essential security interests.” Id.
(emphasis added).
145. Continental, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, ¶ 262.
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the economic crisis was not a qualifying event for Article XI
protection.146 Such diametrically inconsistent results raise
questions about the extent of a state’s ability to regulate in a
way that ensures compliance with its international obligations.
A decentralized system of treaty interpretation and enforce-
ment leads to inconsistent enforcement of obligations and dis-
parities in the size of awards.147 Inconsistent results reduce the
predictability and stability of the regime for both investors and
host states,148 making it difficult to for states to determine
what is owed to foreign investors and place a value on non-
compliance.149
III. EVOLUTION OF SOUTH AFRICA’S INVESTMENT POLICY
The end of apartheid signaled a fundamental change in
South African politics.150 Striving to create a more inclusive
society, the new government included equalizing provisions in
its new constitution and passed supplemental legislation, such
as the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act.151
Around this time, South Africa also began entering into BITs to
secure foreign investment.152 Two notable arbitrations in 2009,
caused South Africa to review its BITs.153 In 2010, South Africa
began unilaterally cancelling BITs that it was party to.154 In
2015, South Africa passed the Act, further signaling its intent
to leave the bilateral investment treaty regime.155 This Part
will examine each of these critical junctures in South Africa’s
investment policy.
A. A New Era in South African Politics
Emerging from political isolation following the end of apart-
heid, South Africa hoped to attract foreign investors back to the
146. Enron, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, ¶ 339.
147. See BONNITCHA ET AL., supra note 14, at 6.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. See Engela C. Schlemmer, An Overview of South African Bilateral In-
vestment Treaties and Investment Policy 31(1) ICSID REV., 167, 168 (2016).
151. S. AFR. CONST. pmbl., chp. 1 art. 1, chp 2 art. 1; Id. at 172.
152. Schlemmer supra note 150, at 168.
153. Id. at 185.
154. Id. at 189, n.112.
155. Id. at 189.
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state.156 In a 1993 interview with Fortune magazine, Nelson
Mandela explicitly called for foreign investment in South Afri-
ca.157 To entice investors, Mandela guaranteed foreign inves-
tors would be protected against expropriation and nationaliza-
tion.158 Furthermore, all profits and dividends would be recov-
erable.159 The national investment policy was designed to com-
bat staggering unemployment that was contributing to un-
rest.160
Anxious to secure foreign investment, South Africa signed its
first BIT in 1994 and would go on to sign 48 more through
2009—though only 21 would be effectuated.161 Many of the
BITs lacked a ratification clause requiring parliamentary con-
sent before their enactment because Section 82(1)(i) of the In-
terim Constitution allowed the president to negotiate and sign
treaties without such consent.162 There is little evidence that
the BITs were debated in the South African Parliament before
their enactment, suggesting that Parliament was not aware of
their existence until much later.163 This denied Parliament an
opportunity to discuss the substance of the BITs and the rami-
fications those agreements would have on domestic politics.164
Failure to understand the obligations imposed on South Africa
by the BITs and their interaction with domestic politics would
prove to be problematic as Parliament enacted national policies
to rectify the harms of apartheid.165
One of South Africa’s most notable apartheid-correcting poli-
cies is the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act,
which came into effect in 2003.166 This legislation is designed to







161. Schlemmer, supra note 150, at 169.
162. Id. at 170–71; S. AFR. (INTERIM) CONST., 1993, art. 82(1)(i).
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165. Id. at 172–73.
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ROSE FULBRIGHT (July 2018), https://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/en-
za/knowledge/publications/fe87cd48/broad-based-black-economic-
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“advance economic transformation and enhance the economic
participation of Black people . . . in the South African econo-
my.”167 This policy is supported by supplemental legislation,
including the Codes of Good Practice on Broad-Based Economic
Empowerment (BEE) and Codes of Good Practice.168 Entities
are given a Black Economic Empowerment Scorecard with five
elements.169 After an assessment, the entity is given a BEE
score, which is necessary for the entity to receiving licensing
from the state and transacting with the state or private enti-
ties.170
This legislation is in tension with the national treatment
standard provided for in South Africa’s BITs.171 As discussed in
Part I, under the national treatment standard, South Africa
must treat foreign investors as well as they treat their own na-
tionals.172 However, the implementation of broad-based black
economic empowerment creates two classes of South African
citizens: those who receive economic preference and those who
do not.173 This leaves the door open for investors to claim that
South Africa has violated the national treatment standard if
they are treated as well as citizens who qualify for the BEE
program.174 Pursuant to the BITs dispute settlement clause,
this issue must be decided by an arbitration tribunal.175 How-
ever, the arbitrator would not have the South African constitu-
tional expertise of a domestic judge, who is better equipped to
analyze the interaction between the constitution and the
Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act.176 Despite
emerging awareness of the tensions created by the interactions
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. The five elements are ownership, management control, skills devel-
opment, enterprise and supplier development, and socio-economic develop-
ment. Id. The requirements for each element vary depending on the size of
the entity but are all aimed at increasing Black participation in the economy.
Id.
170. Id.
171. See Schlemmer supra note 150, at 172–173.
172. See BONNITCHA ET AL., supra note 14, at 15–16.
173. See NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT supra note 166 (discussing how Broad-
based economic empowerment enhances the participation of certain groups of
South Africans.); See Schlemmer supra note 150, at 178–79.
174. See Schlemmer supra note 150, at 178–79.
175. See id. at 173.
176. See id. at 173–74.
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between domestic policy and BITs, BITs underwent few chang-
es between 1994 and 2009.177
The BITs concluded by South Africa contained nearly uni-
form protections for foreign investors.178 The preambles express
a desire to “maintain favourable conditions for investments and
investors” and increase foreign investment resulting in eco-
nomic benefit for both countries.179 Notably, most of the pream-
bles of the BITs reserve no right to South Africa to rectify
apartheid through domestic legislation.180 The preamble of the
current South African Constitution makes reference to achiev-
ing equality and remedying past wrongs; however, these values
were noticeably absent from South Africa’s international
agreements.181 Failure to consistently protect South Africa’s
right to legislate in this area exposed South Africa to arbitra-
tion for violating the national treatment standard.
South African BITs included a broad, open list definition of
investments.182 They afforded protection to natural and legal
persons.183 The BITs did not uniformly select a standard of
treatment to be adhered to, and while some BITs did provide
protections for the preferential treatment of citizens related to
the constitutional values discussed above, there is not enough
evidence to suggest that it was the official policy of South Afri-
ca for these protections to be a standard provision.184
Under the BITs, foreign investors had the opportunity to
bring investor-state dispute claims to either the domestic court
system or international arbitration.185 Still, some BITs con-
tained a clause that prevented a foreign investor from seeking
arbitration if it had attempted to settle the dispute in domestic
courts.186 Finally, South Africa’s dispute resolution clauses also
contained a provision that allowed foreign investors to call
South Africa to arbitration without first asking its consent.187
177. Id. at 172, 173.
178. Id. at 172.
179. Id. at 173.
180. See id. at 173–74.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 174.
183. Id. at 175.
184. Id. at 179.
185. Id. at 183.
186. Id. at 184.
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This provision prevented South Africa from choosing which
disputes it would arbitrate.
Both the broad definitions and provisions contained in South
Africa’s BITs are considered standard for a developing country
attempting to attract foreign investment by capital exporting
countries.188 Despite information about the potential harm of
these agreements, the evolution of South Africa’s BITs from
1994–2009 shows that drafters did very little to minimize
South Africa’s risk in the international investment regime.189
Arguably, the policies were made to secure a large number of
international investors rather than protect its own domestic
policy needs.190 This disregard for its domestic policy led to two
disastrous arbitral awards.191 These awards coupled with an
increase in South Africa’s bargaining power have led to an ab-
rupt change in the state’s international investment policy.192
B. South African BIT Arbitrations
In 2009, the South African Department of Trade and Indus-
try (the Department) reviewed and compiled a risk assessment
of the state’s international investment agreements.193 This re-
view was preceded by two major arbitration cases discussed
below and mentioned in the Department’s report.194 Following
a review of the report Parliament found that the benefits of
BITs were marginal while the costs attributed to BIT arbitra-
tion continued to grow.195
The first detrimental arbitration was convened under the
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules allowing the arbitration to be
conducted confidentially.196 Although many details remain un-
known, an investigation revealed the following facts.197 The ar-







195. See id. at 185–89 (discussing South Africa’s reaction to major arbitral
decisions and Parliament’s decision not to renew expiring BITs.) Assuming
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new the expiring BITs indicates that the value of renewing them was less
than the value of cancelling them.
196. Id. at 186.
197. Id.
2020] Will They Stay or Will They Go? 171
bitration took place between 2001 and 2004 after a Swiss in-
vestor accused South Africa of breaching its obligation to pro-
vide full protection to guarantee the investor’s safety and the
safety of his investment under the Swiss-South Africa BIT.198
The investor also made a claim for expropriation.199 The tribu-
nal held that South Africa failed to provide adequate protection
to the investor and awarded the investor 6.6 million rand plus
interest in compensation.200 It also required South Africa to pay
two-thirds of the investor’s legal fees.201
South Africa received an award covering the costs of the pro-
ceedings in Piero Foresti, Laura de Carli and others v. Republic
of South Africa.202 While the merits of the claim were never ar-
gued before the convened ICSID panel, the foreign investors
claimed breaches of the expropriation and discrimination
standards contained in the South Africa-Italy BIT (1997) and
the South Africa-BLEU BIT (1998).203 The breach of the
agreements stemmed from domestic Black Economic Empow-
erment legislation.204 The investors sought 260 million euros in
compensation; however, the dispute was settled privately for
an undisclosed amount.205 The investors were ordered to pay
South Africa 400,000 euros even though South Africa’s coun-
terclaim was worth over 5 million euros.206 Though victorious
on paper, the arbitration put South Africa on notice that it had
traded a portion of its legislative sovereignty for foreign in-
vestment.
In addition to a chill on their legislative powers, each arbitra-
tion costs the South African government taxpayer funds that
could be used to fund public programs in line with the values
enshrined in its Constitution, such as education.207 With no
gatekeeping mechanism to filter out frivolous claims, host
states like South Africa are battered with arbitrations that risk
emptying their coffers. Even a favorable outcome from the arbi-
198. Id.
199. Id at 186–87.
200. Id. at 187.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 186.
203. Piero Foresti, Laura de Carli and others v. Republic of South Africa,
ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/1, ¶ 1, 47 (Aug. 4, 2010).
204. Schlemmer, supra note 150, at 186.
205. Id.
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207. See id. at 187; see e.g. S. AFR. CONST. pmbl.
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tration does little to ease the burden of the state who must seek
enforcement of the award in a jurisdiction where the losing
party maintains assets.208 Additionally, the state may face nu-
merous hurdles and costs associated with collecting an award if
the foreign investor mounts a defense against enforcement.209
Even with an award in hand, the state is still a long way from
recovering any or all of the costs associated with the arbitra-
tion and any amount awarded by the tribunal.
C. Termination of BITs and the Development of Domestic Pro-
tections
Responding to these developments, South Africa launched a
multi-step plan of action. First, it began unilaterally terminat-
ing its BITs210 and then passed the Protection of Investment
Act, 2015.211 The Act, which came into force in 2018, replaces
the BITs with a domestic framework that offers similar protec-
tions for investors while allowing South Africa to more fully
retain its sovereignty.212 It also addresses several of the weak-
nesses contained in the BITs. Correcting its failure to inter-
twine constitutional values with investment protections, Sec-
tion Four of the Act explicitly states that its purpose is to “pro-
tect investment in accordance with and subject to the Constitu-
tion” while maintaining a balance between the public interest
and “obligations of investors.”213 Taking this a step further, it
also grants South Africa the right to regulate in the areas of
public policy, economic inequality, cultural protections, and
protection of the environment.214 The Act mandates that its in-
terpretation must be consistent with the Constitution of South
Africa, international law,215 and any relevant convention or in-
208. BONNITCHA ET AL., supra note 14, at 80.
209. Id. at 78–82.
210. Schlemmer, supra note 150, at 189. While the BITs have been can-
celled, many contain sunset provisions which keep the provisions contained
within the BIT in effect for a period of time after its termination. Id.
211. Protection of Investment (Act No. 22 of 2015) (S. Afr.) [hereinafter the
Act].
212. See De Wet, supra note 9.
213. The Act, supra note 211, §4(a).
214. Id., §12.
215. As defined by sections 232 and 233 of the Constitution. S. AFR. CONST.,
§§232, 233; The Act, supra note 211, §3(b).
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ternational agreement that South Africa is or will become party
to.216
The Act defines both investors and investments broadly, and
protects them from discrimination under the national treat-
ment standard.217 Making reference to customary international
law, the Act provides foreign investors with “a level of physical
security [equal to security] provided to domestic investors . . .
and subject to available resources and capacity.”218 This word-
ing appears to correspond to the confidential Swiss arbitration
where the arbitral tribunal held that “there was no policing of
the property . . . for several years.”219 The tribunal noted that it
was “unclear whether this failing stemmed from a lack of re-
sources or other systemic failures.”220 Incorporating a re-
striction on security based on resources suggests that the tri-
bunal was correct to believe that the inadequate protection was
a result of a lack of resources. Rather than relitigate the issue,
South Africa has chosen preemptively set limitations on protec-
tion.
Disputes arising under the Act between foreign investors and
the State are subject to mediation or may be brought to any
domestic court, independent tribunal, or statutory body with
proper jurisdiction.221 The government may consent to interna-
tional arbitration with the investor’s home state only if all local
remedies have been exhausted.222 South Africa has again cho-
sen to draft legislation that models the customary international
law approach. Rather than provide blanket consent to be
hauled in front of an arbitral tribunal, South Africa has created
a multistep system to address complaints domestically.223 By
mandating that all claims exhaust local remedies before pro-
ceeding to international arbitration, South Africa has the op-
tion to remedy the problem locally and publicly. Domestic rem-
edies provide the country an opportunity to examine and apply
its own laws. This opportunity is particularly important in
South Africa because of the aforementioned Black Economic
216. The Act, supra note 211, §3(c).
217. Id. at §§2(1), (2), 8(1).
218. Id., §9.
219. Schlemmer, supra note 150, at 187.
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174 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 46:1
Empowerment Act, which mandates that certain nationals re-
ceive specialized treatment to correct for apartheid.224 South
African courts are in the best position to interpret and apply
domestic law given their better understanding of the context
and stakes surrounding its enactment.
Should the foreign investor exhaust all local remedies and
remain unsatisfied, they are left with the option of appealing to
their home state for state-to-state arbitration.225 Once again,
the model that South Africa has created for arbitration resem-
bles the customary international law approach to dispute reso-
lution via diplomatic protection.226 Through this method, South
Africa hopes to reduce the number of claims it will be required
to arbitrate by assuming that few states will want to press
claims on behalf of their nationals against South Africa. Re-
quiring state-to-state arbitration also reduces incentives for
investors to pursue the option because they are not guaranteed
to receive compensation from their home state.227
Reactions to the cancellation of BITs and the passage of the
Act have been mixed. 228 Those against the passage of the Act
tend to be foreign investors and their host states, who see the
change in investor protections as diminishing their rights.229
There may be some merit to this argument. Rather than main-
tain a separate and higher standard of treatment for foreign
investors, South Africa has chosen to equalize the playing field
for domestic and foreign investors while preserving its sover-
eignty. Unhappy with ISDS’s numerous problems, including
interpretation and application of BITs, South Africa seeks to
exercise control over exactly when and how it will be required
to defend itself and its domestic legislation on the international
224. NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT, supra note 166.
225. The Act, supra note 211, §13.
226. Id.
227. Schreuer, supra note 49, at 345.
228. Mills Soko & Mzukisi Qobo, SA’s cancellation of bilateral investment
treaties - strategic or hostile? FIN24 (Sept. 28, 2018),
https://www.fin24.com/Opinion/sas-cancellation-of-bilateral-investment-
treaties-strategic-or-hostile-20180928-3 (comparing reactions to the passage
of South Africa’s passage of The Act. On the one hand, the EU believes the
cancellation of BITs is hostile. On the other, South Africa has passed several
measures of investment and is “widely regarded as one of the world’s most
open investment jurisdictions, with a favourable investment climate by in-
ternational standard, not based on the BITs.”) Id.
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stage. Unsurprisingly, South Africa has chosen to adopt the
customary international law long favored by developing states
over the prevalence of BITs. Rather than attempting to change
the status quo on the global stage, South Africa has chosen to
enact policies at the state level. This policy reduces the state’s
exposure to risk as well as lengthy and costly arbitrations.
IV. SOUTH AFRICA AND ISDS REFORM
If South Africa truly intended to remove itself from the pre-
vailing ISDS regime, it credibly could have done so with the
passage of the Act and the unilateral termination of their BITs.
However, there are several reasons to believe that the passage
of the Act may not be South Africa’s final word on international
investment protection.
A. South Africa’s Actions and Statements Surrounding Interna-
tional Investment
Section 3(c) of the Act allows South Africa to enter into any
“conventions or international agreements” on international in-
vestment.230 This leaves the door open for South Africa to rejoin
the international investment space at a later date.231 If South
Africa had intended for the Act to be the final word on how the
state would handle investment disputes, it could have made
that clear by narrowing the provision to only allow an interpre-
tation consistent with international agreements it was already
party to.
Another indication that South Africa may not truly leave the
ISDS space is its participation in UNCITRAL’s ISDS reform
meetings as an observer state. The meetings, conducted by
Working Group III, are comprised of the forty member states of
the commission, nonmember observer states, and international
non-governmental organizations (IGOs).232 Observer States
may participate in the deliberations.233 South Africa has at-
tended the reform meetings as an observer state and has ac-
tively participated in deliberations on the floor.234 During de-
230. The Act, supra note 211, §3(c).
231. Id.
232. UNCITRAL, Annotated Provisional Agenda, ¶ 1–2 , U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.144, (Feb. 5, 2018) [hereinafter WP 144].
233. Id.
234. See generally Audio files: UNCITRAL Working Group III Sessions
Thirty-Fourth through Thirty-Eight (Dec. 1, 2017- Oct. 10, 2019) (on file with
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liberations the South African delegation advanced arguments
for reform that are consistent with provisions contained in the
Act.235 Though the Working Group’s mandate only gives them
the authority to make recommendations on procedural matters,
South Africa and others have criticized both the procedural and
substantive elements of ISDS, and advocated for broad and
wholistic reform, incorporating both human rights treaties and
the sustainable development goals.236 Additionally, South Afri-
ca has expressed concerns about the cost of arbitration and the
regulatory chill that arbitration has on states.237
On July 17, 2019, South Africa submitted a comprehensive
reform proposal to the Working Group.238 The proposal cap-
tured South Africa’s policy arguments advanced during the
meetings and noted the substantive problems with ISDS in-
cluding defaulting to international arbitration for dispute reso-
lution.239 South Africa put forth a recommendation that mirrors
the dispute settlement process outlined in the Act calling for
alternative mechanisms such as mediation and reliance on the
domestic courts.240 South Africa chastised the current ISDS re-
gime for placing greater weight on property and investor rights
than human rights and environmental principles, and recom-
mended a framework which places the two sets of rights on a
more level playing field.241
author). Working Group III has met five times for a total of fifty sessions. See
generally id. During this time, South Africa has spoken thirty-seven times.
See generally id. In addition to advancing policy arguments, South Africa
requested changes to the official record of the deliberations compiled by the
secretariat. See generally id. It should be noted that South Africa asserts that
they are only attending the ISDS reform meetings to learn more about other
positions. See generally id. This statement is incongruous with the level of
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B. Analyzing South Africa’s Actions and Statements Using the
Exit, Voice, and Loyalty Theory
South Africa’s significant participation in ISDS reform efforts
despite its stated desire to turn its back on the system suggests
the State’s policy goals are more complex than usually present-
ed. Albert Hirschman’s Exit, Voice, and Loyalty theory pro-
vides a useful framework to view South Africa’s actions and
helps illuminate the state’s motives. It postulates that when a
decision maker experiences dissatisfaction with an organiza-
tion that they belong to or engage with, they may remedy their
dissatisfaction in three ways.242 First, they may choose to re-
main loyal to the organization243 and continue to engage with
the organization while silent about their dissatisfaction.244 Sec-
ond, the decision maker may choose to exit the system.245 A de-
cision maker may decide that it is more beneficial to leave the
system rather than seek to reform it.246 Finally, a decision
maker may decide to stay engaged in the system and voice
their concerns.247 The decision to exit, voice concerns, or stay
silently loyal depends on a host of factors, including the availa-
bility of alternative systems to exit to and the power of the de-
cision maker within the system.248 Though Hirschman’s
framework was initially applied to economic enterprises, the
theory has been applied to domestic and international poli-
tics.249
Hirschman’s theory can be applied to the ISDS regime. The
regime functions as a body that must remain responsive to its
members, the states. Each state has a different level of influ-
ence on the regime, which corresponds to the impact that its
exit would have on the stability of the regime. States with more
power in the system will likely exercise their option to voice
their concerns rather than exit the system.250 While the system
242. Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice and the State, 31 WORLD POLITICS 90,
90 (1978).
243. WILLIAM ROBERTS CLARK, MATT GOLDER & SONA N. GOLDER, POWER AND
POLITICAL INSIGHT FROM AN EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY GAME, 3 (2013).
244. Id.
245. Hirschman, supra note 242, at 90.
246. Id. at 95.
247. Id. at 90.
248. Clark et al., supra note 243, at 4, 5.
249. See Hirschman, supra note 242, at 100.
250. Id.
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is not perfect, it is more costly politically and economically for
states with power to exit rather than to reform the system.251
Decision makers exercising their voice option will attempt to
generate reform by changing public policy and public opinion
about the issue at hand.252 Whether the reform comes to frui-
tion depends on the system’s assessment regarding the need for
reform.253 Reform is typically easier when it is apparent that a
need for it exists.254 Thus, states that have spent a considerable
amount of time and capital—both political and economic—will
not easily abandon the system but will seek to reform it if pos-
sible.255
The same dynamic does not exist for smaller states.256 Small-
er states would likely prefer to exercise their option to exit ra-
ther than openly challenge the regime and those with power.257
Challenging the regime costs more political capital for these
states and may result in unintended consequences in unrelated
negotiations.258 Instead, small states will either remain loyal to
the system and continue to reap some benefits or may exit the
system in favor of another system.259 Small states can increase
the impact of their exit if they form a coalition and exit en
masse.260 A threat of mass exit would represent an existential
problem for the ISDS regime as currently constructed and one
that must be addressed in order for the members of the system
to stay.261 However a system will not seek to reform if the
members that choose to exit have little effect on the operation
of the system. This is why mass exit from the ISDS regime is
powerful. If most or all of the capital-importing states left the
251. See id. at 100, 103–04.
252. Id. at 100.
253. See id.
254. Id.
255. See id., at 100–01.
256. See id., at 101.
257. See id., at 104–06.
258. Clark et al., supra note 243, at 8.
259. See Hirschman, supra note 242, at 101–07.
260. See generally Hirschman, supra note 242; see Clark et al., supra note
243, at 7–8 (explaining that the choice to exit provides a pay off to citizens
and a loss to states if the state is dependent on the citizen. Logically, the loss
to the state is multiplied when more than one citizen chooses to exit).
261. See Clark et al., supra note 243, at 5 (explaining that the basic condi-
tion that prompts a citizen to consider exit, voice or loyalty is “a deleterious
change to the citizen’s environment.”).
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ISDS regime, the regime would be worthless because the only
remaining members would be capital exporters with no market
to export to.
However, a dramatic mass exit may not be necessary. In-
stead, states like South Africa, a regional power with a large
market, could exit the system and produce similar straining
results for the system. As a regional power and an investment
hub, other states in the region will look to South Africa for
guidance.262 A complete exit from the system may persuade
surrounding states to adopt similar policies and exit the re-
gime, a huge risk for capital-exporting states that have heavily
invested in the current regime. Further, South Africa’s large
market share, robust economy, and regional leadership is ca-
pable of crafting a new regime that rivals the old.263 In a cir-
cumstance such as this, the states that invested considerably in
the success of the old system risk losing their investment if
they remain unwilling to enact reform. If capital-exporting
states wish to retain the system they have invested in, they
must draw the lines of reform in such a way that small states
with increasing demands continue to participate in the system
but don’t completely devalue the investment already made. All
actors in the system must also take the needs of their citizens
into consideration when discussing reform options.
South Africa’s influence provides significant leverage to pro-
mote reform proposals to the ISDS system. However, rather
than simply reiterating their policy objectives on the floor,
South Africa elevates reform proposals from smaller regional
partners who share similar policy goals.264 This showing of sol-
idarity reinforces the coalition and highlights the risks associ-
ated with failure to reform the system in a meaningful way.
In sum, South Africa’s actions do not entirely resemble either
exit or voice. Instead, its actions are a hybrid of the two. By
participating in the ISDS reform meetings, South Africa exer-
cises its option to voice their complaints about the system. In
contrast, the passage of the Act, coupled with its statement at
the reform meeting that the state is turning its back on the
ISDS system can be viewed as South Africa exercising its op-
262. Daniel Trachsler, South Africa: A Hamstrung Regional Power, 102 CSS
ANALYSIS IN SEC. POLICY, 1, 1 (2011).
263. See Clark et al., supra note 243, at 8.
264. Audio files: UNCITRAL Working Group III Session (October 31, 2018)
(on file with author).
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tion to exit the system. There are two alternative explanations
for South Africa’s behavior. The first is that South Africa would
ultimately like to remain a part of the ISDS system and truly
seeks to reform it. In this scenario the Act may serve as a mod-
el framework for the international community to base reform
on. The similarities between the Act and South Africa’s reform
proposal are too great to ignore.265 The passage and enactment
of the Act demonstrates to the international community that
South Africa’s reform proposal is a viable solution.
The second is that South Africa would prefer to remain in the
ISDS system, but it seeks to increase the credibility of its exit
threat if acceptable reform is not achieved. A credible exit
threat occurs when the payoff to the decision maker, in this
case a state, is larger than the payoff for loyalty or using
voice.266 However, simply having a credible exit threat does not
guarantee that reform will occur.267 From the perspective of the
state contemplating its next move within the Exit, Voice and
Loyalty framework, the largest payoff may derive from its exit.
However, that exit will be meaningless to those in control of
the system if the system is not dependent on the exiting deci-
sion maker.268 Therefore, in order to promote reform, South Af-
rica must have a credible exit threat and show that the contin-
uance of ISDS would harmed if it chose to exit. To create a
credible exit threat, South Africa has passed domestic legisla-
tion that will allow it to fully exit the ISDS system at any time.
This is where South Africa’s position as a regional power is
strongest.269
It would appear that South Africa believes that there is a
similar payoff for using either its voice or exit options, thus ex-
plaining their willingness to pursue both options. Assuming
that South Africa is a rational actor, if the payoff for either
265. Compare generally the Act, supra note 211 (creating the new domestic
framework for international investment arbitration with UNCITRAL, Possi-
ble Reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) Submission from the
Government of South Africa, A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.176 (July 17, 2019) (propos-
ing changes to investor-State dispute settlement regime which is remarkably
similar to the domestic legislation).
266. Clark et al., supra note 243, at 8.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. This note assumes like Clark, Golder & Golder that the system will
favor some actors over others because “the potential for unequal influence is
central to the study of politics.” Id.
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voice or exit was substantially higher, it would simply choose
not to pursue the other option. Instead, it is more likely that
South Africa is confident that they will be able to achieve sub-
stantial ISDS reform in their favor, allowing them to continue
participation in the system.
CONCLUSION
After completing a comprehensive review of its BITs and de-
termining that the costs associated with them outweighed the
benefits, South Africa elected to terminate them. In place of the
BITs, South Africa passed the Protection of Investments Act,
2015, codifying many investment protections historically found
in customary international law. South Africa is one of many
states who have become increasingly dissatisfied with ISDS
and is one of five states to cancel its BITs. Observers believe
that the cancellation of the BITs and the passage of the Act
signaled to foreign investors that South Africa was headed
down a path of protectionism and speculated that FDI levels
would decrease as a result. These moves were seen as South
Africa’s exit from the international investment space.
Sensing a disruption in the international status quo,
UNCITRAL convened Working Group III and tasked it with
exploring procedural ISDS reform. To fulfill their mandate,
Working Group III first sought to identify the problems with
the current regime before undertaking deliberations to correct
them. As an observer state to these reform meetings, South Af-
rica advanced several reforms targeting problems such as
transparency, the cost and length of investor state arbitrations,
and a lack of reciprocal obligations for investors in the area of
human rights and environmental protections. South Africa also
submitted a policy proposal capturing these arguments while
maintaining they had turned their back on the ISDS system.
An analysis of the actions and statements of South Africa
under the Exit, Voice, and Loyalty theory suggests that it may
not be so cut and dry. This Note proposes that South Africa
may wish to remain involved in ISDS if acceptable reforms are
made to the system. This conclusion is supported by the follow-
ing evidence. The text of the Act contains a provision allowing
South Africa to enter into future international agreements and
conventions related to investment. South Africa’s attendance
and high level of participation at the reform conferences. The
reform proposal submitted by South Africa which contains
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many of the same principles and objectives as its domestic leg-
islation. If South Africa truly intended to exit the international
investment regime, efforts to seek reform substantially similar
to its domestic legislation would expensive and duplicative. It
is much more likely that South Africa sees the payoff for exit-
ing the system or reforming the system as nearly identical in
value. Making use of its growing regional influence, South Afri-
ca hopes to advance reform while maintaining a viable alterna-
tive if it cannot negotiate an acceptable regime.
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